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Prior research suggests that the presence of high quality auditors (i.e. proxied by audit firm 
characteristics) constrains accrual-based earnings management, but it inadvertently leads to higher 
real activities manipulation. We investigate whether such trade-off exists between accrual-based 
and real earnings management activities in the presence of female or male auditors. We use a 
sample of UK firms for the period 2009 to 2016 and find that firms audited by female auditors do 
not resort to a higher level real activities manipulation when their ability to engage in accruals 
management is constrained. Overall, our results suggest that the benefits of hiring female auditors 
(i.e. less accrual-based earnings management) are overwhelmingly higher than the costs they might 
bring to the client firms (i.e. higher real activities manipulation). 
 
 























   In this paper, we investigate whether there is a trade-off between accrual-based and real 
earnings management activities in the presence of female or male auditors. Prior research has 
documented that the presence of high quality auditors constrains accrual-based earnings 
management, but it inadvertently leads to higher real activities manipulation (e.g., Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010; Chi et al. 2011; Alhadaba and Clacher 2018). These studies focused exclusively on 
audit firm characteristics to measure high quality auditors and disregard the individual audit 
engagement partners who supervise the audit process and provide certification to the audited 
financial statements. Recently, Ittonen et al. (2013) and Garcia-Blandon et al. (2019) find that firms 
audited by female audit engagement partners are associated with lower accrual-based earnings 
management, and they attributed the lower accrual-based management primarily to the behavioural 
differences between female and male auditors. A significant limitation of Ittonen et al.’s (2013) and 
Garcia-Blandon et al.’s (2019) studies is that they disregard real activities manipulation in their 
analysis. However, firms resort to real activities manipulation when their ability to engage in 
accrual-based earnings management is constrained by high quality auditors (Cohen and Zarowin 
2010; Chi et al. 2011; Alhadaba and Clacher 2018). Consequently, research in auditor gender and 
earnings management cannot be complete without investigating potential unintended consequences 
(i.e. higher real activities manipulation) of hiring female auditors.  
  Despite the increasing interest in the role of auditor gender in financial reporting quality, no 
study to date has investigated whether the presence of female or male auditors constrains real 
activities manipulation and how firms trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings 
management in the presence of female or male auditors. We are motivated to answer this question 
because a growing number of psychology studies show that women are behaviourally different from 
men in cognitive information processing, risk tolerance, diligence, conservativism and 
overconfidence (see Levin et al. 1988; Feingold 1994; Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007; Nettle 2007; 
Schmitt et al. 2008). It has also been suggested in business and economics studies that women are 
behaviourally different from men in business decision contexts (see Ruegger and King 1992; Dwyer 
et al. 2002; Eckel and Grossman 2002; Chen, Velasquez et al. 2016). In the auditing profession, not 
only do female auditors exhibit greater risk aversion and ethical behaviour, they also have the 
ability to obtain voluntary information which may reduce the incidence of information asymmetry 
between auditors and company directors (Gul et al. 2009; Abdelfattah et al. 2020). These suggest 
that female auditors might be better auditors in presiding over the audit than male auditors.  
  Thus, we rely on the notion of gender socialisation theory (Mason and Mudrack 1996), 
which assumes that female auditors are significantly different from male auditors in presiding over 
financial statements (see Ittonen et al. 2013; Hardies et al. 2016; Garcia-Blandon et al. 2019; 




Abdelfattah et al. 2020). From this perspective, and given that the presence of female auditors is 
generally associated with high quality financial information (i.e. less accruals-based earnings 
management), we argue that firms constrained from using accruals-based earnings management 
might shift to other earnings management methods (i.e. real activities manipulation) that are less or 
not subject to external auditor’s scrutiny.  
We focus on auditor gender in this study because auditing is a matter of professional 
judgement and therefore gender-based differences in ethics, conservativism and risk tolerance 
(Khazanchi 1995; Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007, Hardies et al. 2013) are more likely to affect the 
quality of financial information. In their study on whether female or male auditors impair audit 
quality, Hardies et al. (2016, p.8) make the following controversial assertion: “…the behaviour of 
female auditors is more aligned with the quality-orientated aspect of the audit profession (i.e. 
serving the public interest), whereas the behaviour of male auditors is more aligned with the 
revenue-orientated aspect of the profession (i.e. providing good business for their firms)”. This 
suggests that female auditors might be more concerned about the quality of financial information of 
their client firms to the users of financial information and are more likely to provide superior 
monitoring than male auditors.  
To investigate whether there is a trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings 
management activities in the presence of female or male auditors, we analyse a sample of UK firms 
over the period 2009 to 2016. In addition to the level regressions, and consistent with Huang et al. 
(2015), we adopt the changes analysis approach to address omitted variables and endogeneity 
problems. Our findings can be summarised as follows: For the full sample of firms, the presence of 
female auditors has a significant negative impact on both the level of abnormal accruals and the 
annual change in abnormal accruals. When we look at the abnormal accruals and differentiate 
between income increasing and income decreasing accruals management, we find that the presence 
of female auditors has a significant negative impact on the level and the annual change in income 
increasing accruals management but a significant negative impact on annual change in income 
decreasing accruals management only. In further analysis, we find the result to be more pronounced 
in firms audited by female auditors in Big 4 firms than those in non-Big 4 firms and, therefore, it 
seems that female auditors in Big 4 firms display different ethical standards and risk aversion, 
influenced, to some extent by the Big 4 firms-specific training and reputation concerns. In terms of 
real earnings management, we find that the presence of female auditors has no impact on both the 
level and the annual change in the aggregate real earnings management. When we separate the 
aggregate real earnings management into abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production 
costs, we find that the presence of female auditors has a significant negative impact on the level of 
abnormal production costs only. That is, it seems that female auditors play a significant role in 




mitigating accrual-based earnings management. However, there is no evidence to suggest that firms 
audited by female auditors substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings 
management when they are constrained.        
We contribute to the existing literature by showing that while the presence of female 
auditors constrains accrual-based earnings management; it does not lead to higher level real 
activities manipulation. Prior research has exclusively focused on audit firm characteristics when 
examining the impact of high quality auditors on accrual-based and real earnings management 
activities (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Chi et al. 2011; Alhadaba and Clacher 2018). Our paper 
suggests that the benefits of hiring female auditors (i.e. less accruals earnings management) are 
overwhelmingly higher than the costs they might bring to the client firms (i.e. high real activities 
manipulation). Moreover, our paper is different from prior high quality auditors-earnings 
management studies because not only do we investigate the association between female auditors 
and the levels of abnormal accruals and real earnings management activities, we also employ 
changes analysis approach to address the problems associated with omitted variables and 
endogeneity (see Johnstone et al. 2011; Jiang and Son 2015; Huang et al. 2015). We find strong 
evidence of female auditors constraining accruals management with no consequential effect on real 
activities manipulation. These results show the importance of investigating changes in abnormal 
accruals and real earnings management in addition to the absolute levels in order to completely 
understand the effect of high quality auditors on earnings manipulation. Collectively, our evidence 
is important because it shows that the presence of female auditors is not associated with real 
earnings management activities when accrual-based earnings management is constrained.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature to 
motivate our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research design, sample selection and data sources. 
Section 4 presents the results, while section 5 provides additional analyses.  Section 6 provides 
conclusion, implications and limitations. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
In this section, we discuss the relevant literature and develop our hypotheses. First, we focus 
on the theory underpinning our study, followed by the literature on gender differences in skills and 
efforts, and then on the literature on gender, high quality auditors and earnings management. Then, 
we draw on the theory and the existing research to motivate our hypotheses. 
  
2.1 Gender differentiated theories 
There are a number of theoretical approaches that have been used to investigate gender 
issues. These include gender socialisation theory and occupational socialisation theory (see Mason 




and Mudrack 1996). Gender socialisation theory hypothesises that significant psychological and 
cognitive differences exist between men and women in ethical or moral behaviour (Betz et al. 
1989). Khazanchi (1995) report that women tend to be more ethical in the workplace and less likely 
to use unethical behaviour to achieve financial gains, evidence supported by Mason and Mudrack 
(1996) who conclude that women employees appear more ethical than men in business decision 
making. In addition, Mason and Mudrack (1996) suggest that women are more likely to be 
socialised to represent common values compare to men and, consequently, it is expected that 
women tend to respond ethically in dilemma circumstances, such as earnings management. Further, 
since women are perceived to be less overconfident, less aggressive, less competitive and more 
emotive, they are known to be more risk-averse than men (Croson and Gneezy 2009; Byrnes et al. 
1999). Powell and Ansic (1997) report that men and women use different strategies in financial 
decision environments, while Byrnes et al. (1999), in their review of 150 studies, confirm the 
proposition that women, on average, are more cautious and less aggressive (i.e. conservative) than 
men in a range of business decision making contexts. In the auditing profession, Gul et al. (2009) 
contend that females do not only exhibit greater risk aversion and ethical behaviour, they also have 
the ability to obtain voluntary information which may reduce the incidence of information 
asymmetry between female auditors and company directors. This evidence is supported by Hardies 
et al. (2013), who suggest that female auditors are more risk averse than male auditors.  If women 
are generally more risk averse and more conservative in finance related decision (Fellner and 
Maciejovsky 2007), then female auditors are more likely to constrain earnings management than 
male auditors.  
In contrast, occupational socialisation theory hypothesises that gender similarities exist in 
employees within the same work environment (Mason and Mudrack 1996). This is because gender 
differences related to ethics and values disappear when men and women socialised within a work 
environment (Posner and Munson 1981; Gomez-Mejia 1983; Lacy, Bokemeier et al. 1983; Harris 
1990). Because the biological-cultural differentiation of gender becomes normalise (Ingraham 
1994), Smith and Roger (2000) contend that the same may hold for accountancy profession because 
the similarities between men and women in ethics, values and the associated behaviours may be 
achieved through on-the-job socialisation. In support of this view, Clikeman et al. (2001) find no 
gender impact on the attitudes towards the common methods to manage earnings.  
In summary, because female auditors are more ethically aware, risk averse and more 
conservative than male auditors (Khazanchi 1995; Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007; Hardies et al. 
2013), our theoretical development is founded on gender socialisation theory. We, therefore, 
support the argument that there are significant differences between female and male auditors in 
constraining earnings management. 




2.2 Gender differences in skills and effort 
 Drawing on gender socialisation theory which shows that women and men socialised to 
focus on different interests (Mason and Mudrack 1996), we argue that female and male auditors 
might use different skills and efforts when reacting to and evaluating ethical issues, such as earnings 
management. Consistent with this line of reasoning, prior research suggests that female auditors are 
more conservative than male auditors in business decision making contexts (Byrnes et al. 1999). 
Indeed, Basu (1997, p.7) define accounting conservativism as “the accountant's tendency to require 
a higher degree of verification to recognise good news as gains than to recognise bad news as 
losses”. As suggested by Watts (2003), accounting conservativism has benefited the profession 
leading to an improvement in earnings quality to benefit the users of financial information. Given 
that the UK audit engagement partners are required to sign the auditor’s report in their own name, 
auditors are personally accountable to the outcome of the audit of their client firms. Hence, auditors 
who are conservative are more likely to constrain earnings management in their client firms than 
those who are not conservative.  
In contrast, auditors who are overconfident are more likely not to constrain earnings 
management because they may believe that they have the capacity to do so but might fail to 
effectively gauge the client firm’s systems and procedures designed to achieve higher financial 
reporting quality (Owhoso and Weickgenannt 2009). This suggests that auditors who are 
overconfident are less likely to constrain earnings management activities in their client firms.  
Given that men are perceived to be more overconfident than women (Levin et al. 1988; Lundeberg 
et al. 1994; Bengtsson et al. 2005), we expect firms audited by female auditors to be associated with 
less earning manipulation than firms audited by male auditors. 
Extant research also suggests that women are more risk averse than men (Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek 1998; Sunden and Surette 1998; Charness and Gneezy 2012). As suggested by Hardies et 
al. (2013), female auditors, in particular, are more risk averse than male auditors in audit judgement. 
However, Owhoso (2002) finds no significant differences among auditors with similar experience 
in fraud risk. To the extent that female auditors are more risk averse than male auditors (Hardies et 
al. 2013), we expect auditors who are more conservative and less overconfident to be more risk 
averse; hence, firms audited by female auditors are more likely to be associated with less earnings 
manipulation than firms audited by male auditors. 
Gender differences in skills and efforts may also be linked to the glass ceiling phenomenon 
which suggests that women may have to show extra competence before they can be promoted to 
senior positions such as audit engagement partner level. As suggested by Green et al. (2009) and 
Kumar (2010), female financial analysts may need to have skills better than average before they can 
be promoted to senior positions due to gender discrimination or implicit bias. It has also been 




argued that women tend to have high expectations in their area of responsibilities which may 
influence them to spend more time and effort in completing a task (Fondas and Sassalos 2000). 
From the foregoing perspectives, one might argue that female auditors at the audit engagement 
partner level might be more competent and hard-working than male auditors, and therefore, firms 
audited by female auditors are more likely to be associated with less earnings manipulation than 
firms audited by male auditors. 
In general, previous literature suggests that “gender is a significant factor in the 
determination of ethical conduct and that females are more ethical than males in their perception of 
business ethical situations” (Ruegger and King 1992, p.149). It has also been reported that gender 
differences in ethics are more pronounced in an environment where gender equality persists (Chen 
et al. 2016). Building on from gender socialisation theory, Mason and Mudrack (1996) find that 
women in employment are more ethical in comparison with men and that no significant gender 
differences existed in individuals lacking full time employment. Focusing on the auditing 
profession, Bernardi and Arnold (1997) report that female auditors are more ethical than male 
auditors, however, their evidence is in sharp contrast with the evidence reported by other studies 
(see Roxas and Stoneback 2004). If female auditors are more conservative, less overconfident, more 
risk averse and highly competent and hardworking, then we expect them to be more ethical than 
male auditors, and therefore, firms audited by female auditors are more likely to be associated with 
less earnings manipulation than firms audited by male auditors. 
 
2.3 Auditor gender, high quality auditors and earnings management 
In an attempt to investigate the notion that women and men are behaviourally different in 
financial reporting quality, a number of empirical studies have sought to examine the association 
between auditor gender and accruals/audit quality, using a variety of accruals/audit quality proxies. 
In the first of such study, Breesch and Branson (2009) undertake a Belgian study in which they 
examine the effects of auditor gender on audit report and audit opinion. Their most important 
finding is that female auditors discover more potential misstatements as compared to male auditors, 
evidence supported by more recent studies (e.g., Hardies et al. 2015; Hardies et al. 2016; 
Karjalainen et al. 2018; Jones et al. 2019). In contrast, Hossain et al. (2018), in their Australian 
study find that female audit partners are less likely to issue a going-concern opinion for financially 
distressed clients. A third strand of literature suggests that auditor gender is not associated with 
earnings quality (Nasution and Jonnergård 2017).    
In their Finnish study, Niskanen et al. (2011) find that a higher proportion of female auditors 
in private firms allow for discretion in accrual-based earnings management than male auditors. 
After grouping the sample into income increasing earnings management (overstatements) and 




income decreasing earnings management (understatements), they find that the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals reported is driven by income decreasing accruals earnings management. In 
contrasting Niskanen et al. (2011) study, Ittonen et al. (2013) use a sample of Finish and Swedish 
public listed companies and find evidence to suggest that client firms audited by female auditors are 
associated with lower abnormal accruals and the results persist after grouping the sample into 
income increasing and income decreasing accruals earnings management. This evidence has 
recently been supported by Garcia-Blandon et al. (2019) in their Spanish study.  
However, as recently noted by Bedard (2012), the results of single country studies cannot be 
generalised or assumed for another country due to the differences in the level of accountability of 
auditors. This is of particularly important because, for example, the results from prior single country 
studies might have been affected by the incidents of voluntary joint audit – a phenomenon that is 
rare in the UK in recent years. Specifically, Zerni et al. (2012) find that sufficient number of firms 
in Sweden voluntarily employs joint audit and those opted for joint audit have lower abnormal 
accruals, evidence supported by Ittonen and Trønnes (2014) who find similar results across Finish 
and Swedish firms. Even if the results from prior single country studies can be generalised in the 
UK, the literature has exclusively focused on accrual-based earnings management without 
considering real earnings management activities. Unlike accrual-based earnings management, real 
earnings management activities such as the significant cuts in firms’ vital investment in research 
and development (R&D), selling, general and administrative activities, and increase in unnecessary 
investments in inventories leads to high long-term costs to firms’ shareholders (Roychowdhury 
2006). Therefore, it is worth investigating whether hiring female auditors would lead to unintended 
costs to firms’ shareholders (i.e. high real earnings management).   
Meanwhile, more recent research has evolved and focuses on the impact of high quality 
auditors (i.e. proxied by audit firm characteristics) on both accrual-based and real earnings 
management activities. In their study on accrual-based and real earnings management around 
Seasoned Equity Offering in the US, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) most important finding is that high 
quality auditors proxied by Big N audit firms and long tenure are associated with higher real 
activities manipulation. Chi et al. (2011) also undertake a US study in which they examine the 
association between high quality auditors and accrual-based and real earnings management 
activities around Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). They use audit firm characteristics, such as Big N 
audit firms, long tenure, industry expertise and audit fees to proxy high quality auditors and their 
most important finding suggests that higher quality auditors ability to constrain accrual earnings 
management leads to client firms resorting to potentially even more costly real activities 
manipulation. In a UK study, Alhadaba and Clacher (2018) examine the impact of high quality 
auditors on real and accrual-based earnings management around IPOs. They use Big N audit firms 




to proxy audit quality and find that high quality auditors constrain the manipulation of discretionary 
accruals and the use of real activities manipulation that occurs through the management of 
discretionary expenses. However, they find evidence to suggest that firms audited by high quality 
auditors do undertake sales-based real earnings manipulation. These results suggest that hiring high 
quality auditors is partially costly due to the significant increase in real earnings management 
activities.  A significant limitation of these studies is that they focused exclusively on audit firm 
characteristics to measure high quality auditors and disregard the individual audit engagement 
partners who preside over the audit process and provide certification to the audited financial 
statements.  
The current paper investigates whether the presence of female or male auditors constrains 
real activities manipulation and how firms trade-off accrual-based and real earnings management in 
the presence of female or male auditors. We believe that our paper is different in many ways from 
the existing literature. First, unlike Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Chi et al. (2011) and Alhadaba and 
Clacher (2018) studies, we use audit partner characteristics such as audit partner gender to proxy 
high quality auditors. This is important because Section 503 of the Companies Act 2006 
implemented by Auditing Practices Board (APB) in 2009 requires the audit engagement partner to 
sign the auditor’s report in his/her name on behalf of the audit firm. Because the current UK 
regulation makes the audit partner personally accountable to the outcome of the audit of their client 
firms, research on high quality auditors and earnings management cannot be complete without 
considering the quality of individual audit partners who preside over the audit process and provide 
certification to the audited financial statements. Second, given that women in employment are more 
ethically aware in comparison with men (Mason and Mudrack 1996), we extend gender 
socialisation theory which posits that significant differences exist between women and men in 
evaluating ethical issues to how firms trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings 
management in the presence of female or male auditors. Third, because firms can engage in real 
activities manipulation when they are constrained from accrual-based earnings management by high 
quality auditors (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Chi et al. 2011; Alhadaba and Clacher 2018), we 
believe that we take auditor gender studies (e.g., Ittonen et al. 2013; Garcia-Blandon et al. 2019) 
forward by investigating how firms trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management 
in the presence of female or male auditors. Fourth, in addition to investigating the impact of auditor 
gender on the absolute values of abnormal accruals and real earnings management, we also 
ascertain the impact on the changes in both accrual-based and real earnings management from one 
year to the next. In this way, we develop the work of Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Chi et al. (2011) 
and Alhadaba and Clacher (2018) to address omitted variables and endogeneity problems. Thus, we 




believe that we undertake a more wide-ranging analysis of the impact of high quality auditors on 
accrual-based and real earnings management than any other existing research.  
In summary, there is a strong evidence of significant differences between female and male 
auditors and it is likely that female auditor’s ability to constrain accrual-based earnings 
management might not lead to higher level real activities manipulation. While we acknowledge that 
real earnings management, as business decisions, is less likely to attract the attention of external 
auditors (Chi et al. 2011; Cohen and Zarowin 2010) and therefore some firms might exploit this and 
shift to more real earnings management activities, Alhadab and Clacher (2018) noted that it is still 
possible that auditors might question real earnings management. In essence, they build this 
proposition on the finding of Sohn (2011) and Kim and Park (2014). While Kim and Park (2014) 
show that the probability of auditor resignations is associated with real earnings management 
activities, Sohn (2011) find that 55% of high quality auditors (i.e. Big 4 auditors) who participated 
in their survey indicated their willingness to ask their client firms to correct real earnings 
management or at least stop it in the future. Building on from the gender socialisation theory which 
suggests that female auditors are more ethically aware and risk averse in comparison to male 
auditors (Mason and Mudrack 1996; Hardies et al. 2013), and the significant differences between 
female and male auditors in presiding over high quality financial information (Ittonen et al. 2013; 
Garcia-Blandon et al. 2019), we expect that female auditors would not only constrain firms from 
engaging in accrual-based earnings manipulation, but they are also more likely to constrain firms 
from engaging in real earnings management activities.  Accordingly, our predictions are as follows:     
 
H1: Firms audited by female auditors exhibit lower level of accrual-based 
      earnings management than firms audited by male auditors. 
  
 
H2: Firms audited by female auditors exhibit lower level of real earnings 
       management than firms audited by male auditors. 
  
 
3.  Research design and sample selection 
3.1. Research design 
First, we follow extant research (see Srinidhi et al. 2011) and use Accruals Estimation Errors 
(AEE) as a proxy for accruals quality. Prior studies have employed different approaches to 
represent accruals quality. For instance, Jones (1991) defines it as the extent to which accruals are 
not opportunistically used by managers, while Dechow and Dichev (2002) define it as the extent to 
which current year accruals are associated with previous, current and subsequent year operating 
cash flows. McNichols (2002) combines these two methods and develops a more rigorous 




estimation for accruals quality. We, therefore, follow McNichols (2002) and draw our measure for 
accruals quality based on AEE using the following expectation model: 
 
ACCi,t /ATi,t-1 = β0 + β1OCFi,t-1 /ATi,t-2 + β2OCFi,t / ATi,t-1 + β3OCFi,t+1 /ATi,t + β4ΔSALESi,t /ATi,t-1 + 
β5PPEi,t/ATi,t-1 + εit                                                                                                                                                     (1) 
 
where, ACC is accruals measured as the difference between income before extraordinary items and 
cash flows from operating activities. OCF refers to cash flows from operations deflated by lagged 
total assets (AT) in years t, t-1, and t+1. ΔSALES refers to the change in sales. PPE is the gross 
property, plant, and equipment. We run equation (1) annually for each two-digit SIC industry with 
at least 8 observations in order to get an estimation for all coefficients in equation (1) which are 
then used to estimate the AEE as the residuals from equation (1)1.  Following Srinidhi et al. (2011), 
we focus on the absolute value of AEE where its high value indicates poor accruals quality and vice 
versa. 
 Second, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate real earnings management (REM). 
Whereas real activities manipulation such as overproduction of inventory reduces cost of goods sold 
and increases the reported earnings, cutting down discretionary expenses such as R&D, selling, 
general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses also increases the reported earnings. In particular, 
Roychowdhury (2006) and other subsequent studies (see Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012) 
have provided evidence that these measures capture real activities manipulation. Therefore 
consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), we estimate the normal level of production costs using the 
following equation (2):  
 
PRODi,t /ATi,t-1 = β0 + β11/ATi,t-1 + β2SALESi,t / ATi,t-1 + β4ΔSALESi,t /ATi,t-1 + β5 β4ΔSALESi,t-1 /ATi,t-1  
+ εit                                                                                                                                                                                              (2) 
 
Where PROD is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year t and the change in inventory from year t-1 
to year t; and SALES is the net sales in year t. We run equation (2) annually for each two-digit SIC 
industry with at least 8 observations in order to get an estimation for all coefficients in equation (2) 
which are then used to estimate the abnormal production cost as the residuals from equation (2). 
The higher the value of the residual suggests greater amount of overproduction of inventory, 
leading to greater reported earnings. 
                                                          
1 To sustain sufficient number of observations, we follow previous literature (Rosner 2003; Athanasakou et al. 2011; 
Igbal et al. 2009; Alhadaba and Clacher 2018) and exclude firms with less than 8 observations from our expectation 
model. Specifically, and due to lack of sufficient observations, our approach is an improvement from both Athanasakou 
et al. (2011) and Alhadaba and Clacher (2018) who employed 6 observations each in the calculation of their earnings 
management variables in the UK.    




 Also, we estimate the normal level of discretionary expenses following Roychowdhury 
(2006) in equation (3) below:    
 
DISXi,t /ATi,t-1 = β0 + β11/ATi,t-1 + β4ΔSALESi,t-1 /ATi,t-1 + εit                                                                          (3) 
 
where DISX is the sum of R&D and SG&A in year t. We run equation (3) annually for each two-
digit SIC industry with at least 8 observations in order to get an estimation for all  coefficients in 
equation (3) which are then used to estimate the abnormal discretionary expenses as the residuals 
from equation (3). We multiply the residuals by -1 and the higher the values suggest the greater 
discretionary expenses cut to increase the reported earnings. REM is the sum of abnormal level of 
production costs and abnormal level of discretionary expenses2.  
 
3.2.Empirical Model 
To test our main hypotheses of whether firms audited by female auditors’ exhibit lower 
accrual-based and real earnings management, we employ equations (4) and (5) below: 
 
ABS_AEEt = β0 + β1FAUDITORt+ β2SIZEt + β3LEVt + β4OCFt + β5ROAt + β6MBVt + β7SALESGt 
+ β8REMt + β9NOAt-1 + β10CYCLEt-1 + β11AUDTENUREt + β12BIG4t + β13BSIZEt + β14INDt + 
β15FEMt + β16FCEOt + β17FCFOt + β18YEAR_FEt + β19IND_FEt + εt             (4) 
 
REMt = β0 + β1FAUDITORt+ β2SIZEt + β3LEVt + β4OCFt + β5ROAt + β6MBVt + β7SALESGt + 
ABS_AEEt + β9NOAt-1 + β10CYCLEt-1 + β11AUDTENUREt + β12BIG4t + β13BSIZEt + β14INDt + 
β15FEMt + β16FCEOt + β17FCFOt + β18YEAR_FEt + β19IND_FEt + εt                (5) 
 
Table 1 contains all the variable definitions we use in our analysis. In terms of our two dependent 
variables, ABS_AEE is the absolute value of AEE and REM is the aggregate value of real earnings 
management. In terms of our explanatory variable, FAUDITOR is a dummy variable that is set to 
one if the firm is audited by a female auditor and zero otherwise. In addition, we include in our 
regression models a comprehensive set of control variables that extant research (see Ittonen et al. 
2013; Garcia-Blandon et al. 2019) shows that they influence earnings management activities. In 
particular, we control for firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), operating cash flows (OCF), return on 
assets (ROA), market-to-book value (MBV) and growth in sales (SALESG). Because auditors 
scrutiny/quality affect earnings management, we follow extant research (see DeFond and 
                                                          
2 It is important to highlight that we did not include abnormal level of cash flow from operations in determining our 
REM. This is because extant research (see Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012) suggests that while for example price 
discount and overproduction decrease cash flow from operations, cutting discretionary expenses increases it. Because 
these real activities affect cash flow from operations in different directions, the results is always ambiguous, hence, we 
excluded them from our main analysis.    




Jiamabalvo 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Myers et al. 2003; Cohen and Zarowin 
2010; Chi et al. 2011; Alhadaba and Clacher 2018) and control for Big 4 auditors (BIG4) and 
auditor tenure (AUDTENURE).  
Zang (2012) documents that there is a trade-off between real activities manipulation and 
accruals earnings management. Hence, we control for REM in equation (4) and ABS_AEE in 
equation (5). Furthermore, we control for accounting flexibility within the accounting systems that 
firms are more or less likely to take advantage of, in the current accounting period. For example, 
and given the limited flexibility in accounting choices and accruals reversals, manager’s ability to 
manipulate accruals upward in the current accounting period is constrained by accruals management 
from the previous accounting periods (Zang 2012). Consistent with Zang (2012), we control for 
previous accounting choices using the net operating assets at the beginning of the year (NOAt-1) to 
represents accruals management in the previous accounting periods. This is because the overstated 
abnormal accruals in the past earnings are also reflected in net operating assets in the current 
accounting period. On the other hand, because firms with longer operating cycle are more likely to 
have greater flexibility for accrual management (Zang 2012), we control for accounting flexibility 
using operating cycle at the beginning of the year (CYCLEt-1). This is because the larger accruals 
account is more likely to affect accruals reversal if the operating cycle is longer. 
Extant research also suggests that earnings management is affected by corporate governance 
quality and, in particular, board of directors’ attributes (see Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Barua et al. 
2010; Peni and Vähämaa 2010; Arun et al. 2015). We, therefore, control for board size (BSIZE), 
independent directors (IND), independent female directors (FEM), CFO gender (FCFO) and CEO 
gender (FCEO).  
Earnings management may differ across years and industries. Therefore, we also control for 
year (YEAR_FE) and industry (IND_FE) fixed effects. Significantly, our analysis includes multiple 
firms across different years, and therefore, the residuals from our regression models may be 
correlated across firms and years (Peterson 2009). In line with Petersen (2009), all our regression 
models are based on both firm and year levels clustered robust standard errors to address the 
residual dependence created by the firm and year specific effects. 
Prior research (see Johnstone et al. 2011; Jiang and Son 2015; Huang et al. 2015) suggests 
that an analysis based on level regressions is vulnerable to correlated omitted variables and 
endogeneity problems leading to biased results. To overcome these problems, we follow Huang et 
al. (2015) and use changes regression model to control for omitted variables that are presumed to be 
constant overtime to mitigate potential endogeneity. The changes regression model also allows us to 
directly test the changes to female auditors to changes in accrual-based and real earnings 
management activities from one year to the next, and increases our ability to draw causality 




relationship between the presence of female auditors and earnings management. Accordingly, we 
specify and estimate accrual-based and real earnings management changes regression models in 
equations 6 and 7 as follows: 
 
D_ABS_AEEt = β0 + β1D_FAUDITORt + β2D_SIZEt + β3D_LEVt + β4D_OCFt + β5D_ROAt + 
β6D_MBVt + β7D_SALESGt + β8D_REMt + β9D_NOAt-1 + β10D_CYCLEt-1 + β11D_AUDTENUREt 
+ β12D_BIG4t + β13D_BSIZEt + β14D_INDt + β15D_FEMt + β16D_FCEOt + β17D_FCFOt + 
β18YEAR_FEt + β19IND_FEt + εt                                       (6) 
 
 
D_REMt = β0 + β1D_FAUDITORt+ β2D_SIZEt + β3D_LEVt + β4D_OCFt + β5D_ROAt + 
β6D_MBVt + β7D_SALESGt + β8D_ABS_AEEt + β9D_NOAt-1 + β10D_CYCLEt-1 + 
β11D_AUDTENUREt + β12D_BIG4t + β13D_BSIZEt + β14D_INDt + β15D_FEMt + β16D_FCEOt + 
β17D_FCFOt + β18YEAR_FEt + β19IND_FEt + εt                                       (7) 
 
All the variables that start with “D” indicate the difference in values of equations 4 and 5 
variables between the current year and the previous year. Given that our variable of interest is 
FAUDITOR which is set to one if the firm is audited by a female auditor and zero otherwise, 
D_FAUDITOR in equations 6 and 7 represents one in the year t if the auditor in the year t-1 and in 
the year t is a male and a female respectively, and zero otherwise. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.3. Data sources and sample selection 
Our sample consists of FTSE 350 index firms for the study period 2009-2016. The start of 
2009 is important because in the UK, Section 503 of the Companies Act 2006 requires the auditor’s 
report to be signed by the audit engagement partner in his or her own name, for, and on behalf of 
the audit firm for financial years beginning on or after 6 April 2008. Hence, 2009 is the first 
financial year end with the available audit partners’ names. We obtained the names of the audit 
partners from two sources, FAME database and supplemented by the firms’ annual reports if the 
name of an auditor is missing from the database. We then review the auditors’ names from FAME 
database and firms’ annual reports to determine the gender of each audit partner, an approach 
consistent with auditor gender studies (see Ittonen et al. 2013; Hardies et al. 2016; Garcia-Blandon 
et al. 2019).   
Our initial search in FAME database yielded a sample of 2,808 total firm-year observations. 
Following prior studies (see Basioudis and Francis 2007; Basioudis et al. 2008), we delete 425 firm-
year observations related to the financial sector from our sample because they have different 
regulations and financial reporting requirements. In order to ensure sufficient observations for the 
estimation of equations (1), (2) and (3) coefficients, we only include firms with, at least, 8 




observations in each industry-year. Finally, we delete 590 firm-year observations due to missing 
audit and financial data. Table 2 summarises the sample distribution by year and industry, where the 
final sample with full data consists of 1,793 firm-year observations for the study period 2009-2016. 
We obtained our financial and corporate governance data from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope 
and BoardEx databases, respectively.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics: 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the different variables used in the analysis. 
Whereas Panel A summarises the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 1,793 firm-year 
observations, Panel B separately summarises the descriptive statistics for firms audited by female 
auditors and the firms audited by male auditors. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
As Panel A shows, 9% of our sample firms are audited by female auditors. The 9% female 
auditor representation is slightly lower than other recent auditor gender studies, for example, 12% 
and 10% in Ittonen et al. (2013) and Garcia-Blandon et al. (2019), respectively. However, our final 
sample of 1,793 firm-year observations is far bigger than Ittonen et al.’s (2013) 770 firm-year 
observations across Finnish and Swedish listed firms and Garcia-Blandon et al’s. (2019) 721 
Spanish listed firms. Nevertheless, the differences in female auditor representation suggest that the 
UK has a lower female auditor representation at the audit partner level than other European 
countries. Panel A of Table 3 also shows that the average absolute value of accruals estimation 
errors (ABS_AEE) for the whole sample is 5%, evidence slightly lower than Ittonen et al. (2013) 
absolute values of abnormal accruals of 7% based on modified Jones (1991)  and 6% based on 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, respectively, across Finish and Swedish firms. On 
average, the aggregate real earnings management (REM) for the full sample stood at 7%. This is 
slightly lower than the 9% REM reported by Alhadaba and Clacher (2018) across UK IPOs firms.  
Panel B of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of firms audited by female auditors and 
those firms audited by male auditors. The table also tests the differences in means (medians) for the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference between firms audited by female and male auditors. 
Interestingly, Panel B shows that the magnitudes of ABS_AEE is significantly lower at 5% (5%) 
for firms with female auditors, suggesting that female auditors are more likely to constrain accruals 
management than male auditors. In terms of REM, however, only the differences in the median are 
significantly lower at 1% between firms audited by female and male auditors. Apart from firm size 




(SIZE), the proportion of debt financing (LEV), return on assets (ROA), market to book value 
(MBV), sales growth (SALESG) and the length of operating cycle (CYCLEt-1), Panel B shows that 
the two groups are not significantly different in respect of  OCF,  NOAt-1, AUDTENURE, BIG4, 
BSIZE, IND, FEM, FCEO and FCFO. 
We report Pearson correlations matrix between ABS_AEE (REM), FAUDITOR and other 
control variables in Table 4. In terms of accrual-based earnings management (real earnings 
management), there is a negative and significant (negative but insignificant) association between 
ABS_AEE (REM) and FAUDITOR, suggesting that firms audited by female auditors exhibit lower 
accruals management but they do not resort to an extensive real activities manipulation. However, 
this result is still preliminary and inferences should only be made after the inclusion of other control 
variables in the regression model. In general, the correlation matrix does not show any potential 
serious multicollinearity problems. In addition, the variance inflation factor (VIF) in each of the 
regression models from Table 5 until Table 8 is less than 10 (Kennedy, 2008) and therefore our 
reported results are not impacted by any multicollinearity issues. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.2. Auditor gender and accruals management 
We report our analysis investigating the impact of auditor gender on both the level and 
change in accruals management in Table 5.  In Model 1 of Panel A, we present the level regression 
results of the absolute value of accruals estimation errors (ABS_AEE), while Models 2 and 3 show 
the level regression results of income increasing (positive AEE) and income decreasing (negative 
AEE), respectively. In Model 1, we find that the presence of female auditors has a significant 
negative impact on the absolute value of accruals estimation errors suggesting, thereby, that female 
auditors are more likely to challenge firms’ accruals-related financial reporting decisions and 
therefore firms audited by female auditor are associated with lower accrual-based earnings 
management relative to other firms audited by their male counterparts.  
However, this analysis focuses on the absolute value of accruals estimation errors and does 
not differentiate between income increasing and income decreasing accruals management. We, 
therefore, differentiate between the two by dividing the sample using the sign of the AEE. 
Specifically, our results reported under Model 2 of Panel A shows a negative and significant 
association between FAUDITOR and positive AEE. Interestingly, our analysis reported under 
Model 3 shows a negative albeit insignificant association between FAUDITOR and the absolute 
value of negative AEE, suggesting therefore that the impact of female auditor is more prominent 
with upward earnings management. 




In Panel B of Table 5, we repeat our analysis, but in this case, we regress our annual change 
in auditor gender on the annual change in accruals estimation errors. In Models 1, 2 and 3 of Panel 
B, the dependent variables are change in ABS_AEE, change in positive AEE and change in 
negative AEE. As shown in Model 1 of Panel B, FAUDITOR is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level. In the positive and negative AEE Models (i.e. Models 2 and 3), FAUDITOR 
is negative and statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Significantly, our results 
with the change models are more pronounced and persist in both income increasing and income 
decreasing accruals management, suggesting that accruals management is lower in firms audited by 
female auditors. The coefficient estimates of other control variables in both the level and change 
regressions models are generally in line with extant research (see Ittonen et al. 2013; Zang 2012). In 
particular, SIZE, LEV, ROA and BSIZE are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
accruals management is generally lower in large, debt financing, profitable firms as well as firms 
with an average board size of eight members.   
Overall, consistent with gender socialisation theory, gender differences in reacting to and 
evaluating ethical issues are found in auditing with female auditors constraining accrual-based 
earnings management in comparison with male auditors. Our results reported in Table 5 show that 
the presence of female auditors constrains accruals management, thus, implying that female auditors 
make every effort to constrain aggressive earnings management in their client firms in comparison 
with male auditors. In general, the negative relationship between the presence of female auditors 
and accrual-based earnings management is consistent with our theoretical prediction. That is, 
constrained discretionary accruals manipulation by female auditors is consistent with gender 
socialisation theory which suggests that female auditors are more ethically aware and risk averse in 
comparison with male auditors (Mason and Mudrack 1996; Hardies et al. 2013). This implies that, 
with reference to gender socialisation theory, female auditors are more likely to demonstrate 
stronger feelings and react ethically in dilemma situations (Mason and Mudrack 1996), such as 
earnings management. Our empirical findings also support H1 and are consistent with prior auditor 
gender results of Ittonen et al. (2013) and Garcia-Blandon et al. (2019), who document that female 
auditors are associated with lower abnormal accruals.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.3. Auditor gender and real earnings management 
Table 6 presents the regression results investigating the impact of auditor gender on both the 
level and change in real earnings management. In Panel A of Table 6 we examine the impact of 
auditor gender on the abnormal level of production costs (APROD), abnormal level of discretionary 




expenses (ADISX) and the aggregate REM. In Models 1 and 2 of Panel A, and in contrast to our 
expectation in H2, we find that the presence of female auditor is not associated with the overall 
levels of real earnings management and the abnormal discretionary expenses. However, in Model 3 
we find that the presence of female auditors has a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
abnormal level of production costs. 
In Panel B of Table 6 we replicate our analysis, but in this case, we regress change in auditor 
gender on the annual change in real earnings management. In Models 1, 2 and 3 of Panel B, the 
dependent variables are the changes in REM, ADISX and APROD, respectively. As Panel B of 
Table 6 demonstrates, the presence of female auditor is not associated with the overall real earnings 
management and the associated components (i.e. ADISX and APROD). In contrast with Chi et al. 
(2011) and Alhadaba and Clacher (2018) findings, real earnings management in its aggregate form 
or individual components is not prominent in firms audited by female auditors when we use the 
change regression model.  
Overall, our results suggest that the presence of female auditors is more likely to constrain 
accrual-based earnings management, but they are not associated with real earnings management 
activities. That is, our evidence based on the changes regression model suggests that the benefits of 
hiring female auditors (less accruals management) are overwhelmingly higher than the costs they 
might bring (i.e. high real earnings management). 
Given that our main results on whether firms trade-off between accrual-based and real 
earnings management activities in the presence of female auditors are based on the changes 
regression models and the fact that the level regressions are vulnerable to omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity problems, our additional analyses in the next section are based on the changes 
regression model to ensure efficient and consistent results.    
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5. Additional analyses: 
5.1.High vs. low auditor scrutiny and accruals management  
Our results reported in subsection 4.2 suggest that the presence of female auditors constrains 
accruals management. Thus, we repeat our analysis using a sample of firms with high (Big 4) vs. 
low (non-Big 4) auditor scrutiny/quality and investigate whether female auditors in Big 4 firms 
constrain more or less accruals management than female auditors in non-Big 4 firms. Because Big 
N audit firms are more likely to be more experience, to have more reputation at risk and to invest 
more resources in auditing (see DeFond and Jiamabalvo 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 
1999; Zang 2012), they are more likely to constrain accruals management than smaller firms. 




Indeed, Alhadaba and Clacher (2018) report that Big N firms constrain the manipulation of 
discretionary accruals than smaller firms.  
While we acknowledge that our result might be applicable to all female auditors, one might 
argue that the result in Big 4 firms might be more pronounced than in non-Big 4 firms for two 
reasons. First, because Big 4 firms are more likely to provide specialised and more sophisticated 
training to their staff, and get accreditation from some reputable agencies and peer reviews (Dopuch 
and Simunic 1980; Toeh and Wong 1993), female auditors in Big 4 firms might display different 
ethical standards than female auditors in non-Big 4 firms. Second, given that Big 4 firms have large 
number of clients and have more to lose when regulators discover accounting breaches that they 
have not reported (DeAngelo 1981; DeFond and Jiamabalvo 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 
1999; Zang 2012), it is likely that female auditors in Big 4 firms risk aversion would be more 
prominent than that of their counterparts in non-Big 4 firms due to high reputational damage and 
financial loss associated with any unreported accounting breaches. On balance, because female 
auditors in Big 4 firms are more likely to display different ethical standards and are more risk 
averse than female auditors in non-Big 4 firms, we would expect our results of female auditors in 
Big 4 audit firms to be more pronounced than female auditors in non-Big 4 firms. In order to test 
this proposition, we divide the full sample into two subsamples; namely, firms audited by Big 4 
firms and firms audited by non-Big 4 firms. We then estimate equation (6) for these subsamples 
separately. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7, where Panel A represents firms 
audited by Big 4 audit firms and Panel B for firms audited by non-Big 4 firms.  
Our results under Model 1 of Panel A show that firms audited by female auditors in Big 4 
firms are associated with lower accruals management. Similarly, our results reported under Models 
2 and 3 suggest that firms audited by female auditors in Big 4 audit firms have lower income 
increasing as well as income decreasing accruals management. However, Panel B reports our 
analysis for firms audited by female auditors in non-Big 4 audit firms and it appears that the 
significance level has decreased in this subsample, supporting, to some extent, our conjecture that 
the results would be more pronounced in firms presided over by female auditors in Big 4 audit 
firms. In general, our results demonstrate that female auditors in Big 4 audit firms are more likely to 
constrain accruals management than firms audited by female auditors in non-Big 4 firms, probably 
because female auditors in Big 4 firms display different ethical standards and are more risk averse 
than female auditors in non-Big 4 firms. 
  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 




5.2. High vs. low auditor scrutiny and real earnings management  
Our results in subsection 4.3 suggest that firms do not engage in extensive real activities 
manipulation when their ability to manipulate discretionary accruals is constrained. However, prior 
research suggests that Big 4 audit firms (i.e. high auditor scrutiny) are associated with higher real 
activities manipulation (see Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Chi et al. 2011). In contrast, Alhadaba and 
Clacher (2018) find that Big 4 audit firms (i.e. high auditor scrutiny) constrain the use of real 
activities manipulation that occurs through discretionary expenses. Given this competing evidence 
and because female auditors in Big 4 firms might be more ethical and risk averse than those in non-
Big 4, we expect our results to be significantly different between the two groups. To test this 
proposition, we group the full sample into two subsamples; namely, firms audited by Big 4 firms 
and firms audited by non-Big 4 firms. We then estimate equation (7) for these subsamples 
separately. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 8, where Panel A represents firms 
audited by Big 4 audit firms and Panel B for firms audited by non-Big 4 firms. 
Our results in Models 1 and 2 of Panel A confirm our earlier results that firms audited by 
female auditors in Big 4 audit firms are not associated with extensive real activities manipulation. 
However, in Model 3 we find weak evidence to suggest that firms audited by female auditors in Big 
4 audit firms are associated with a lower abnormal level of production costs.  In respect of firms 
audited by female auditors in non-Big 4 audit firms, Models 1, 2 and 3 of Panel B show no 
association between female auditors and all forms of real activities manipulation. 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
 
5.3. Sensitivity tests:  
We perform a number of sensitivity tests to confirm the robustness of our results. First, we 
exclude those firm years during the recession period (2009-2012) from our primary models and we 
find substantively similar results (untabulated) to those reported earlier. Second, we use an 
alternative measure of the aggregate real earnings management (REM). In particular, we measured 
REM as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal cash flow from operations 
instead of the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs. Third, given 
that previous studies (see Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Chi et al. 2011; Cai et al. 2018; 
Choi et al. 2018; Kung et al. 2018) have used all the three proxies instead of the two to measure the 
aggregate REM, we measured REM as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal cash 
flow and the abnormal production costs to check the robustness of our results. Fourth, we use the 
performance-adjusted Jones model to estimate alternative accrual-based earnings management 
proxy. Finally, we use alternative control variables such as revenues instead of total assets to 




measure firm size and total liabilities instead of long-term debt to measure debt financing. In all 
cases, our results (untabulated) are generally qualitatively similar to those reported earlier.      
 
6. Conclusion, implications and limitations 
In this paper, we investigate whether there is a trade-off between accrual-based and real 
earnings management activities in the presence of female or male auditors. Although prior research 
has investigated accrual-based earnings management in the presence of female or male auditors (see 
Ittonen et al. 2013; Garcia-Blandon et al. 2019), our paper adds to the literature by investigating 
whether firms trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management in the presence of 
female or male auditors. Significantly, we contribute to the literature by showing that firms audited 
by female auditors do not resort to a higher level of real activities manipulation when their ability to 
engage in accruals management is constrained. 
While prior research suggests that real earrings management represents a potential 
inadvertent consequence of appointing high quality auditors (see Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Chi et 
al. 2011), our results show that the presence of female auditors is not associated with real earnings 
management activities when accrual-based earnings management is constrained. Overall, our results 
suggest that the benefits of hiring female auditors (i.e. less accruals earnings management) are 
overwhelmingly higher than the costs they might bring to the client firms (i.e. high real activities 
manipulation).   
Our results have important implications for audit firms, listed companies, investors, other 
users of financial information and regulators. For the audit firms, the total membership of the 
accountancy bodies has continued to grow steadily in recent years3. However, we find only 9% of 
our sample firms to have female audit engagement partners, suggesting that audit firms need to do 
more in their recruitment, training and promotion decisions to ensure more female representation at 
the audit partner level. For the listed companies, the results suggest that auditor’s gender is more 
likely to affect the audit process and the financial reporting quality because of the inherent 
behaviour differences between men and women, hence, management should be aware of the gender 
effect when appointing a new auditor. For the investors and other users of financial information, 
particular attention should be given to the gender of the auditor that they engage because gender 
differences could affect the financial reporting quality. From a regulatory perspective, these 
findings can be used as a basis for, perhaps, stipulating a minimum threshold of female auditors for 
audit practices in a bid to enhance audit quality and address gender imbalance in the profession.     
                                                          
3 As at the end of 2016, there were 350,912 members across the U.K. and Republic of Ireland accountancy bodies 
relative to 294,996 in 2009, a difference representing 19% increase (Financial Reporting Council 2017). 




Finally, there are two important limitations to our paper. First, we focus on only UK FTSE 
350 index firms and this may affect the generalisability of our conclusions to all firms; hence, our 
results should be interpreted with caution. Although we use a larger sample size relative to Ittonen 
et al.’s. (2013) 770 firm-year observations and Garcia-Blandon et al.’s. (2019) 721 firm-year 
observations, our sample included only FTSE 350 index firms, where such firms tend to be larger 
firms. It would be interesting to see if our results hold for smaller companies in the UK. Second, we 
only use accrual-based and real earnings management in our analysis relative to the consequential 
effect of auditors’ gender on classification shifting. Future research could examine whether 
auditor’s gender behavioural differences are more likely to mitigate more or less classification 
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Variable  Definition 
ABS_AEE = the absolute value of accrual estimation errors  
REM  = real earnings management measured as the sum of  abnormal 
discretionary expenses and abnormal production cost 
FAUDITOR = a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm is audited by female 
auditor, and zero otherwise 
SIZE = firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV = leverage measured as the proportion of long-term debt to total equity 
OCF = cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets 
ROA = return on Assets measured as net income divided by lagged total assets 
MBV  = market-to-book value ratio measured as market capitalization divided 
by book value of common equity 
SALESG  = sales growth measured as change in sales from year t-1 to year t 
NOAt-1  = captures accrual-based earnings management in prior years and 
measured as a dummy variable set to one if the net operating assets 
(i.e., shareholders' equity less cash and marketable securities plus total 
debt) at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales are above the 
median of the corresponding industry-year, and 0 otherwise 
CYCLEt-1  the sum of account receivable days and inventory days less payable 
days at the beginning of the year  
AUDTENURE  a dummy variable that is set to one if the number of years the auditor 
has audited is above the sample median of ten years, and zero 
otherwise  
BIG4  = a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm is audited by a big 4 
auditor, and zero otherwise 
BSIZE  = board size measured as total number of directors on the board 
IND  = independent is measured as the proportion of independent directors to 
the total number of directors 
FEM  = independent female is measured as the proportion of independent 
female directors to the total number of directors 
FCEO  = a dummy variable set to one if the CEO is female, and zero otherwise 
FCFO = a dummy variable set to one if the CFO is female, and zero otherwise 
YEAR_FE = year fixed effects indicator variables 










Table 2  
Sample Distribution by Year and Industry 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Chemicals 2 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 41 
Construction 20 18 22 23 24 25 24 25 181 
Manufacturing 58 60 60 61 62 62 62 62 487 
Farming 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 16 
Mining 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 64 
Pharmaceutical 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 24 
Printing & Publishing 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 72 
Retail 20 19 21 21 20 21 20 20 162 
Services 56 50 52 58 60 61 62 62 461 
Transportation 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 87 
Utilities 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 127 
Wholesale 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 71 




















Table 3  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample (n = 1,793) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
ABS_AEE 0.045 0.030 0.059 0.013 0.057 
REM 0.068 0.061 0.082 -0.178 0.202 
FAUDITOR 0.092 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 13.398 13.212 1.598 12.416 14.402 
LEV 0.414 0.295 6.609 0.000 0.670 
OCF 0.104 0.087 0.135 0.032 0.149 
ROA 0.064 0.057 0.137 0.018 0.103 
MBV 3.196 2.050 18.083 1.017 3.784 
SALESG 0.078 0.046 0.355 -0.028 0.137 
NOAt-1 0.905 1.000 0.293 1.000 1.000 
CYCLEt-1 97.933 49.329 89.467 5.053 91.265 
AUDTENURE 0.413 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
BIG4 0.899 1.000 0.301 1.000 1.000 
BSIZE 8.034 8.000 2.091 6.000 9.000 
IND 0.507 0.500 0.194 0.429 0.625 
FEM 0.284 0.144 0.192 0.067 0.433 
FCEO 0.152 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.000 
FCFO 0.318 0.000 0.626 0.000 0.000 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression models.  
All variables are defined in Table 1. 




Panel B: Tests for Differences 
Variable 
Firms audited by female 
auditors 








Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
t-statistics  z-statistics 
ABS_AEE 0.036 0.025 0.039 0.048 0.039 0.063 2.03** 2.46
** 
REM 0.037 0.040 1.524 0.049 0.080 0.555 0.21 3.35
*** 
SIZE 13.348 13.163 0.958 13.769 13.499 1.624 2.81*** 3.28
*** 
LEV 0.264 0.135 1.463 0.363 0.294 7.537 3.11*** 3.89
*** 
OCF 0.104 0.105 0.084 0.108 0.100 0.098 0.31 0.90 
ROA 0.043 0.039 0.097 0.060 0.057 0.107 1.25 1.97
** 
MBV 2.626 1.623 4.553 2.984 2.316 16.391 0.12 2.50
** 
SALESG 0.028 0.016 0.206 0.085 0.051 0.376 1.23 2.64
*** 
NOAt-1 0.536 1.000 0.502 0.675 0.000 0.506 -0.97 -0.97 
CYCLEt-1 48.223 65.042 89.968 102.070 49.137 75.996 3.68*** -1.47 
AUDTENURE 0.464 0.000 0.502 0.409 0.000 0.492 -0.89 -0.89 
BIG4 0.899 1.000 0.304 0.905 1.000 0.294 0.17 0.17 
BSIZE 7.828 8.000 1.656 7.962 8.000 1.983 0.50 0.38 
IND 0.495 0.571 0.245 0.522 0.556 0.194 1.11 -0.003 
FEM 0.223 0.100 0.162 0.213 0.144 0.208 -0.14 -0.32 
FCEO 0.159 0.000 0.369 0.162 0.000 0.368 0.05 0.05 
FCFO 0.348 0.000 0.590 0.328 0.000 0.647 -0.25 -0.67 
N 165 1,628   
This table presents the tests for differences between means and medians of firms audited by female auditors and firms audited by male auditors. 
*, **, *** denote significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 























Correlation Coefficients for the Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
 ABS_ 
AEE 
FAUDITOR SIZE LEV OCF ROA MBV SALESG REM NOAt-1 CYCLEt-1 AUD- 
TENURE 
BIG4 BSIZE IND FEM FCEO FCFO 
ABS_AEE 1                  
FAUDITOR -0.040*** 1                 
SIZE -0.126*** -0.012*** 1                
LEV -0.038** -0.004 0.035 1               
OCF 0.127*** -0.010 0.017 0.003 1              
ROA -0.037 -0.042 0.039 -0.010 0.583*** 1             
MBV 0.038 -0.004 -0.037 0.675*** 0.099*** 0.088*** 1            
SALESG 0.035 -0.041 -0.038 -0.001 0.041 0.040 0.009 1           
REM 0.033** -0.007 -0.041 -0.001 0.152*** 0.072** 0.029 0.022 1          
NOAt-1 0.064
* 0.032 0.171*** -0.019 -0.042 -0.137*** -0.106*** 0.096*** 0.062 1         
CYCLEt-1 0.090
*** -0.025 -0.034 -0.011 -0.133*** -0.025 -0.021 0.040 -0.008 0.137*** 1        
AUDTENURE 0.035** 0.047 0.132*** 0.057 -0.125*** -0.074** 0.077** 0.000 -0.057 -0.051 -0.076** 1       
BIG4 -0.006 -0.006 0.322*** 0.001 0.099*** 0.018 -0.013 -0.017 -0.023 -0.096*** -0.245*** 0.110*** 1      
BSIZE -0.096*** -0.017 0.680*** 0.019 0.059 0.013 0.020 0.034 -0.013 0.123*** -0.134*** 0.078** 0.267*** 1     
IND 0.006 -0.037 0.282*** 0.020 0.050 0.002 0.034 -0.012 -0.010** -0.064* -0.066** 0.030 0.434*** 0.270*** 1    
FEM 0.031 0.005 -0.130*** -0.041 0.019 -0.025 -0.017 -0.041 0.004 -0.071** 0.149*** 0.041 0.016 -0.265*** 0.163*** 1   
FCEO -0.012 -0.002 0.109*** -0.028 -0.098*** -0.102*** -0.078** -0.039 -0.019 -0.052 0.151*** 0.058* 0.009 0.075** 0.174*** 0.174*** 1  
FCFO -0.003 0.008 -0.014 0.001 -0.005 -0.046 -0.002 -0.050 0.003 0.028 0.164*** 0.036 -0.004 -0.004 0.134*** 0.358*** 0.246*** 1 
This table presents Pearson Correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and control variables. 
*, **, *** denote significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 1. 







Panel A: Accruals Estimation Errors Regression Results (Levels Model) 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Dependent Variable =  
ABS_AEE 
Dependent Variable =  
Positive AEE 
Dependent Variable =  
ABS_Negative AEE 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 0.112 4.79*** 0.029 2.01** 0.003 0.73 
FAUDITOR -0.015 -2.74*** -0.012 -2.36** -0.008 -1.34 
SIZE -0.004 -2.12** -0.001 -2.10** 0.000 0.26 
LEV -0.012 -3.82*** -0.002 -4.36*** -0.003 -1.44 
OCF 0.089 2.61*** -0.382 -4.30*** 0.443 9.37*** 
ROA -0.020 -2.10** 0.247 4.10*** -0.365 -11.76*** 
MBV 0.001 0.56 -0.001 -0.92 0.001 1.66* 
SALESG 0.003 0.30 0.005 0.98 0.029 1.67* 
REM 0.002 2.15** 0.001 2.56** 0.000 0.26 
NOAt-1 0.010 1.68
* 0.015 2.92*** 0.001 0.33 
CYCLEt-1 0.082 2.18
*** 0.042 1.93* -0.011 -0.19 
AUDTENURE 0.001 1.12 -0.002 -0.32 -0.007 -1.80* 
BIG4 -0.006 -0.44 0.021 1.50 0.012 1.28 
BSIZE -0.014 -2.53*** 0.004 -2.11** 0.001 -0.93 
IND 0.013 0.75 0.001 0.24 -0.002 -0.11 
FEM 0.001 0.29 -0.005 -1.37 0.003 0.79 
FCEO -0.002 -0.31 0.005 0.88 -0.003 -0.68 
FCFO -0.004 -1.06 0.003 0.72 -0.002 -0.99 
YEAR_FE YES  YES  YES  
IND_FE YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R2 0.093  0.554  0.659  
F-statistics 8.63***  13.77***  20.66***  
Highest VIF Value 4.97  3.18  4.21  
N 1,793  906  887  
This table presents the level regression results of the accrual estimation errors analyses. The dependent variables are absolute 
value of accruals estimation errors (ABS_AEE) in model 1, positive accruals estimation errors (AEE) in model 2, and absolute 
value of negative accruals estimation errors (AEE) in model 3. AEE is measured as residuals from a model suggested by 
McNichols (2002).   
*, **, *** denote significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The OLS regression models are estimated with dual clustered robust standard errors (both firm and year). 
















Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel B: Accruals Estimation Errors Regression Results (Changes Model) 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Dependent Variable =  
D_ABS_AEE 
Dependent Variable =  
Positive D_AEE 
Dependent Variable =  
Negative D_AEE 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 0.016 0.72 0.019 1.51 0.004 0.63 
D_FAUDITOR -0.018 -3.22*** -0.009 -2.83*** -0.005 -2.36** 
D_SIZE -0.033 -2.25** -0.076 -3.03*** -0.025 -1.84* 
D_LEV -0.001 -2.37** -0.001 -1.27 0.001 0.79 
D_OCF -0.010 -1.13 -0.114 -1.73* -0.060 -0.39 
D_ROA 0.074 0.38 0.359 2.01** -0.121 -0.43 
D_MBV 0.001 1.01 0.001 2.63*** -0.001 -0.85 
D_SALESG -0.002 -0.24 -0.006 -0.82 0.050 2.43** 
D_REM 0.001 2.12** 0.001 2.49** -0.001 -0.34 
D_NOAt-1 0.015 2.09
** 0.004 0.27 0.010 0.50 
D_CYCLEt-1 -0.051 -0.30 0.012 0.42 -0.001 -2.41
** 
D_AUDTENURE -0.011 -1.34 -0.016 -2.22** 0.012 0.90 
D_BIG4 -0.010 -1.27 -0.017 -1.17 0.191 1.77* 
D_BSIZE -0.008 -3.28*** -0.008 -2.31** 0.006 0.99 
D_IND 0.055 1.58 0.032 0.72 0.048 0.34 
D_FEM -0.008 -0.60 -0.009 -0.72 -0.017 -0.70 
D_FCEO 0.010 0.39 0.063 2.43** -0.007 -0.21 
D_FCFO -0.005 -1.82* -0.003 -0.40 0.006 0.63 
YEAR_FE YES  YES  YES  
IND_FE YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R2 0.054  0.330  0.167  
F-statistics 3.28***  8.59***  7.96***  
Highest VIF Value 4.37  4.60  3.59  
N 1,530  787  743  
This table presents the changes regression results. All the variables that start with “D” compute the changes in values of the 
variables between the current year and the previous year. The dependent variables are the changes in absolute accruals 
estimation errors (D_ABS_AEE) in model 1, firms with positive changes in accruals estimation errors (D_AEE) in model 2, 
and firms with negative changes in accruals estimation errors (D_AEE) in model 3. AEE are measured as residuals from a 
model suggested by McNichols (2002).   
*, **, *** denote significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The OLS regression models are estimated with dual clustered robust standard errors (both firm and year). 
















 Panel A: Real Earnings Management Regression Results (Levels Model)  
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Dependent Variable =  
REM 
Dependent Variable =  
ADISX 
Dependent Variable = 
APROD 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.017 -0.87 -0.115 -0.99 -0.064 -2.21*** 
FAUDITOR -0.028 -0.61 0.074 1.38 -0.086 -2.04** 
SIZE -0.007 -1.68* -0.009 -0.88 0.012 1.76* 
LEV -0.063 -1.22 -0.003 -1.01 -0.039 -0.55 
OCF 0.322 4.70*** 0.446 3.51*** -0.046 -1.02 
ROA 0.124 0.79 -0.088 -0.88 -0.065 -3.49*** 
MBV 0.001 0.88 0.002 1.08 0.019 0.81 
SALESG -0.005 -0.19 -0.003 -0.23 0.010 0.88 
ABS_AEE 0.200 1.04 0.114 0.92 0.021 2.19** 
NOAt-1 0.197 3.31
*** 0.128 5.76*** -0.008 -1.02 
CYCLEt-1 -0.000 -0.99 -0.055 -0.17
 0.059 1.71* 
AUDTENURE -0.087 -1.36 -0.085 -3.31*** -0.009 -0.84 
BIG4 0.076 1.30 0.092 1.93* -0.069 -1.67* 
BSIZE -0.003 -0.18 -0.014 -1.85* 0.063 1.15 
IND -0.350 -1.77* -0.262 -3.13*** -0.086 -0.17 
FEM 0.025 0.44 -0.009 -0.41 0.003 1.99** 
FCEO -0.018 -0.27 -0.020 -0.63 -0.043 -1.77** 
FCFO -0.008 -0.22 0.001 0.44 -0.081 -0.26 
YEAR_FE YES  YES  YES  
IND_FE YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R2 0.138  0.193  0.241  
F-statistics 4.52***  6.17***  7.98***  
Highest VIF Value 4.55  3.38  4.41  
N 1,793  1,793  1,793  
This table presents the level regression results of the real earnings management analyses. The dependent variables are the 
aggregate value of real earnings management (REM) in model 1, abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX) in model 2, and 
abnormal production costs (APROD) in model 3.  APROD and ADISX are measured as residuals following Roychowdhury 
(2006) and the sum of both equal REM.   
*, **, *** denote significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The OLS regression models are estimated with dual clustered robust standard errors (both firm and year). 














Table 6 (Continued) 
 
 Panel B: Real Earnings Management Regression Results (Changes Model)  
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Dependent Variable =  
D_REM 
Dependent Variable =  
D_ADISX 
Dependent Variable = 
D_APROD 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.019 -0.17 -0.017 -1.34 -0.012 -0.88 
D_FAUDITOR  -0.286 -1.33 -0.023 -0.98 -0.002 -1.56 
D_SIZE -0.109 -0.85 -0.061 -1.97** 0.023 2.07** 
D_LEV 0.002 1.21 -0.001 -1.19 0.008 1.26 
D_OCF 0.251 0.83 0.041 0.71 0.092 0.64 
D_ROA 0.144 0.68 0.037 0.87 0.089 1.73* 
D_MBV -0.002 -1.19 0.001 0.78 -0.004 -1.58 
D_SALESG -0.018 -0.58 -0.007 -1.89* -0.047 -0.74 
D_ABS_AEE -0.037 -0.13 0.012 0.29 0.030 1.54 
D_NOAt-1 0.067 0.81 -0.023 -1.30 0.016 1.05 
D_CYCLEt-1 0.001 1.04 0.001 1.58
 -0.020 -0.82 
D_AUDTENURE -0.110 -1.42 -0.017 -1.68* -0.013 -0.78 
D_BIG4 0.122 0.48 0.016 0.66 0.067 1.80* 
D_BSIZE 0.039 0.95 0.004 1.06 0.004 0.64 
D_IND -0.186 -2.20** -0.010 -2.18** -0.055 -0.16 
D_FEM -0.076 -0.28 0.024 1.54 -0.017 -0.69 
D_FCEO -0.010 -0.11 -0.025 -1.03 -0.003 -0.31 
D_FCFO 0.031 0.21 -0.019 -1.40 0.001 0.26 
YEAR_FE YES  YES  YES  
IND_FE YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R2 0.101  0.118  0.133  
F-statistics 3.31***  4.22***  5.88***  
Highest VIF Value 2.74  2.55  3.07  
N 1,530  1,530  1,530  
This table presents the changes regression results of the real earnings management analyses. All the variables that start with 
“D” compute the changes in values of the variables between the current year and the previous year. The dependent variables 
are the changes in the aggregate value of real earnings management (D_REM) in model 1, firms with changes in abnormal 
discretionary expenses (D_ADISX) in model 2, and firms with changes in abnormal production costs (D_APROD) in model 3.  
APROD and ADISX are measured as residuals following Roychowdhury (2006) and the sum of both equal REM.   
*, **, *** denote significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The OLS regression models are estimated with dual clustered robust standard errors (both firm and year). 
















Regressions of Accruals Estimation Errors by Auditor Size (Changes Model) 
 
Panel A: Big 4 Auditors 
 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Dependent Variable =  
D_ABS_AEE 
Dependent Variable =  
Positive D_AEE 
Dependent Variable =  
Negative D_AEE 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 0.116 0.89 0.021 1.55 0.008 0.78 
D_FAUDITOR -0.013 -2.66*** -0.011 -2.72*** -0.007 -2.20** 
D_SIZE -0.005 -2.15** -0.001 -0.23 0.001 0.42 
D_LEV -0.001 -0.12 -0.002 -3.79*** -0.003 -1.41 
D_OCF -0.085 -0.58 -0.375 -5.01*** 0.464 9.80*** 
D_ROA -0.010 -0.30 0.237 4.95*** -0.386 -12.09*** 
D_MBV 0.000 0.69 0.001 -0.38 0.001 1.60 
D_SALESG -0.003 -0.25 -0.002 -0.28 0.032 1.76* 
D_REM 0.002 2.27** 0.001 1.95* 0.000 0.22 
D_NOAt-1 0.009 1.69
* 0.011 2.34** 0.001 0.21 
D_CYCLEt-1 0.004 2.43
** 0.001 2.51** 0.012 0.12 
D_AUDTENURE -0.001 -0.20 -0.004 -0.72 -0.007 -1.61 
D_BSIZE -0.002 -0.61 -0.005 -2.67*** -0.002 -1.23 
D_IND 0.014 0.74 -0.004 -0.23 0.003 0.16 
D_FEM 0.002 0.38 -0.003 -0.63 0.001 0.27 
D_FCEO 0.001 0.11 -0.010 -1.78* -0.005 -1.10 
D_FCFO -0.001 -0.39 -0.003 -0.77 -0.002 -0.64 
YEAR_FE YES  YES  YES  
IND_FE YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R2 0.041  0.183  0.135  
F-statistics 2.96***  9.09***  6.49***  
Highest VIF Value 4.46  3.24  3.83  


















Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Non-Big 4 Auditors 
 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Dependent Variable =  
D_ABS_AEE 
Dependent Variable =  
Positive D_AEE 
Dependent Variable =  
Negative D_AEE 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 0.082 0.80 0.162 0.72 0.058 0.51 
D_FAUDITOR -0.004 -0.35 -0.030 -0.88 0.019 0.36 
D_SIZE -0.003 -0.41 0.001 0.12 0.027 2.40** 
D_LEV -0.013 -0.43 -0.092 -0.36 -0.038 -0.73 
D_OCF -0.016 -0.21 -0.014 -0.11 -0.052 -0.45 
D_ROA -0.143 -1.06 0.329 1.85* -0.443 -1.88* 
D_MBV 0.003 0.97 -0.024 -1.84* -0.003 -0.83 
D_SALESG -0.008 -0.24 -0.037 -1.34 0.040 0.67 
D_REM 0.033 0.84 -0.054 -0.62 -0.026 -1.58 
D_NOAt-1 0.024 0.74 0.000 0.42 0.019 1.16 
D_CYCLEt-1 0.001 0.27 0.012 0.67 -0.000 -0.87 
D_AUDTENURE 0.049 2.04** 0.021 0.62 -0.021 -0.30 
D_BSIZE -0.013 -1.67* 0.004 0.30 -0.030 -2.85*** 
D_IND -0.043 -0.67 -0.314 -2.08** -0.207 -6.73*** 
D_FEM 0.029 1.57 0.024 0.69 -0.035 -1.47 
D_FCEO -0.009 -0.22 -0.129 -1.59 0.179 2.87*** 
D_FCFO -0.014 -0.55 0.013 0.26 -0.003 -0.19 
YEAR_FE YES  YES  YES  
IND_FE YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R2 0.346  0.391  0.461  
F-statistics 8.19***  12.98***  13.28***  
Highest VIF Value 3.42  2.27  4.38  
N 255  255  255  
This table presents the changes regression results of the accrual estimation errors analyses by auditor size. All the variables that start 
with “D” compute the changes in values of the variables between the current year and the previous year. The dependent variables are 
the changes in absolute value of accruals estimation errors (D_ABS_AEE) in model 1, firms with changes in positive accruals 
estimation errors (D_AEE) in model 2, and firms with changes in negative accruals estimation errors (D_AEE) in model 3. AEE are 
measured as residuals from a model suggested by McNichols (2002).   
*, **, *** denote significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The OLS regression models are estimated with dual clustered robust standard errors (both firm and year). 
















Regressions of Real Earnings Management by Auditor Size (Changes Model) 
 
Panel A: Big 4 Auditors 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Dependent Variable =  
D_REM 
Dependent Variable =  
D_ADISX 
Dependent Variable =  
D_APROD 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.027 -0.67 -0.020 -1.69* -0.031 -0.41 
D_FAUDITOR -0.215 -1.29 0.001 0.28 -0.009 -1.85* 
D_SIZE -0.077 -0.48 -0.037 -0.19 0.035 1.93* 
D_LEV 0.001 0.80 -0.001 -0.14 0.027 0.43 
D_OCF 0.349 1.69* 0.025 0.41 0.010 0.83 
D_ROA 0.098 0.52 0.024 0.53 -0.019 -1.90* 
D_MBV -0.001 -0.70 -0.001 -0.29 -0.044 -0.78 
D_SALESG -0.015 -0.53 -0.009 -2.29** -0.062 -0.97 
D_ABS_AEE -0.012 -0.04 0.018 0.42 0.079 1.50 
D_NOAt-1 0.048 0.65 -0.025 -1.55 0.094 1.03 
D_CYCLEt-1 0.001 1.36 -0.000 1.54 -0.016 -0.30 
D_AUDTENURE -0.104 -2.28** -0.016 -1.44 -0.038 -0.59 
D_BSIZE 0.034 0.95 0.003 0.82 0.012 0.46 
D_IND -0.016 -2.11** -0.011 -0.21 0.005 0.08 
D_FEM -0.037 -0.13 0.033 1.98** 0.095 0.17 
D_FCEO -0.034 -0.40 -0.027 -1.20 -0.091 -0.33 
D_FCFO 0.020 0.19 -0.024 -2.88***  -0.032 -0.12 
YEAR_FE YES  YES  YES  
IND_FE YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R2 0.113  0.159  0.136  
F-statistics 4.83***  5.91***  5.12***  
Highest VIF Value 2.96  2.59  3.43  



















Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Non-Big 4 Auditors 
 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Dependent Variable =  
D_REM 
Dependent Variable =  
D_ADISX 
Dependent Variable =  
D_APROD 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.119 -0.81 0.041 0.55 0.023 1.12 
D_FAUDITOR -0.042 -0.36 -0.008 -0.29 -0.030 -0.78 
D_SIZE -0.047 -0.29 -0.092 -0.19 -0.042 -1.67* 
D_LEV 0.134 0.89 0.127 0.75 0.009 0.80 
D_OCF 0.283 1.76* -0.169 -0.32 -0.185 -0.98 
D_ROA -0.162 -1.15 -0.213 -2.38** 0.019 1.96* 
D_MBV -0.005 -0.84 -0.016 -0.34 0.090 0.78 
D_SALESG -0.067 -2.10** -0.060 -0.46 0.002 0.20 
D_ABS_AEE -0.262 -0.45 -0.509 -0.50 0.040 0.37 
D_NOAt-1 0.107 0.97 0.352 1.39 0.073 0.88 
D_CYCLEt-1 -0.087 -0.21 -0.001 -0.75 0.097 0.42 
D_AUDTENURE -0.007 -0.37 -0.067 -0.64 -0.040 -1.94* 
D_BSIZE 0.013 0.34 -0.033 -1.86* -0.014 -1.10 
D_IND -0.192 -2.35** -0.178 -1.69* -0.020 -0.10 
D_FEM 0.044 0.50 0.182 1.00 -0.008 -0.48 
D_FCEO -0.111 -0.63 -0.071 -0.21 -0.012 -0.80 
D_FCFO 0.134 1.11 0.041 0.26 0.034 0.91 
YEAR_FE YES  YES  YES  
IND_FE YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R2 0.442  0.384  0.531  
F-statistics 13.16***  11.17***  16.86***  
Highest VIF Value 3.77  3.67  4.04  
N 261  261  261  
This table presents the changes regression results of the real earnings management analyses by auditor size. All the variables that start 
with “D” compute the changes in values of the variables between the current year and the previous year. The dependent variables are 
the changes in the aggregate value of real earnings management (D_REM) in model 1, firms with changes in abnormal discretionary 
expenses (D_ADISX) in model 2, and firms with changes in abnormal production costs (D_APROD) in model 3.  APROD and 
ADISX are measured as residuals following Roychowdhury (2006) and the sum of both equal REM.   
*, **, *** denote significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The OLS regression models are estimated with dual clustered robust standard errors (both firm and year). 
All variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
